United States District Court, D. Minnesota
S. Doty, Judge
matter is before the court upon the objection by pro se
plaintiff Lorenzo Haynes to the July 19, 2019, report and
recommendation (R&R) of Magistrate Judge Hildy Bowbeer.
The court reviews the R&R de novo. See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b).
background of this case is fully set forth in the R&R,
and the court will not repeat it here except as necessary.
After a thorough review of the file and record, the court
finds that the R&R is well-reasoned and correct.
argues that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that he
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether defendants Nola Karow, Jeffery Felt, Brent Plackner,
and Daryl Quiram (collectively, defendants) were deliberately
indifferent to his serious medical needs, and therefore
subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Eighth Amendment. See generally ECF No. 260. The
objection, Haynes raises many of the same arguments made
before the magistrate judge. A number of these arguments can
be summarized as an objection to the magistrate judge’s
conclusion that summary judgment is appropriate despite the
differences in care Haynes received while in prison versus
the care he has received since his release. Haynes asserts
that defendants should have “provided the same standard
of treatment, care, tests, medications, and
devices/accessories that was in fact provided for him once he
was released.” ECF No. 270 at 3. The appropriate
standard of care, Haynes contends, would have included a
referral to a specialist to address his back and ankle pain.
ECF No. 260 at 8–9. Haynes argues that summary judgment
is not appropriate because defendants’ failure to make
a referral like his current doctor did shows that there are
genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendants were
deliberately indifferent to his serious medical need. See
generally ECF Nos. 260, 270. To support this argument,
Haynes cites to § 2:2 of the September 2019 Update of
the Medical Malpractice: Checklists and Discovery manual,
which states that a general practitioner’s failure to
refer a patient to a specialist under certain circumstances
may render the general practitioner subject to the same legal
duty as a specialist in the field. See ECF No. 271,
standard to show that a provider was deliberately indifferent
to a serious medical need “is akin to ‘criminal
recklessness.’” ECF No. 258 at 11 (citing
Olson v. Bloomberg, 339 F.3d 730, 736 (8th Cir.
2003)). As the magistrate judge correctly pointed out,
Haynes’s claims that defendants deviated from the
appropriate standard of care sound in negligence or medical
malpractice. Id. at 13. Indeed, such arguments do
not support a constitutional claim. See Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). “[I]nmates have
no constitutional right to receive a particular or requested
course of treatment, and prison doctors remain free to
exercise their independent medical judgment.”
Dulaney v. Carnahan, 132 F.3d 1234, 1239 (8th Cir.
1997) (citing Long v. Nix, 86 F.3d 761, 765 (8th
Cir. 1996)). The fact that defendants’ “method of
physical examination and treatment may not have followed
community standards, or that [defendants] disagreed with
[Haynes’s] suggested course of treatment does not
amount to deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.” Bellecourt v. U.S., 994 F.2d 427,
431 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at
106). The record in this case makes clear that defendants
acted in good faith to diagnose and treat Haynes’s
injuries; the mere fact that Haynes’s outside doctors
undertook a different course of treatment does not mean
defendants were deliberately indifferent. See id.
next asserts that, by presenting “impeachment”
evidence in the form of allegedly inconsistent interrogatory
responses, he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Karow was deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs. ECF No. 242; id., Ex. 1. Although the
court does not weigh credibility on motions for summary
judgment, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 255 (1986), no such determination is needed here.
The court has reviewed the alleged impeachment material and
finds that Karow’s responses are not inconsistent.
Rather, she first responds by explaining her standard
procedure in various situations described in the
interrogatories. See, e.g., ECF No. 242, Ex. 1 at 4.
She concludes by stating that she does not recall her exact
response with regard to the situations involving Haynes.
Id. A statement describing her standard response to
a situation is not inconsistent with a statement that she
does not remember her exact response to a specific situation,
and thus Karow’s interrogatory responses do not impeach
also contends that the magistrate judge erred in recommending
summary judgment because she failed to address certain facts
that Haynes believes create a genuine issue of material fact.
See generally ECF No. 260. Despite Haynes’s
belief that there are genuine issues of material fact,
“[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly
preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that
are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.”
Villanueva v. City of Scottsbluff, 779 F.3d 507, 510
(8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
After review of the filings and evidence presented on summary
judgment, the court determines that the magistrate judge
properly considered all of the evidence and alleged factual
disputes. The facts raised by Haynes in his objection, but
not explicitly addressed by the magistrate judge in the
R&R, are not relevant to the outcome of this case. As
such, the magistrate judge did not err in declining to
Haynes asserts that all of these alleged errors by the
magistrate judge show that she was biased against him. ECF
No. 260, at 16, 20, 26. Haynes’s claim of judicial bias
must be factually substantiated. Nerison v. Solem,
715 F.2d 415, 416–417 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating that a
judge’s familiarity with a party and his prior legal
proceedings does not “automatically or
inferentially” establish judicial bias; judicial bias
claims must be factually substantiated). Further, an
unfavorable judicial ruling on its own “does not raise
an inference of bias.” Harris v. State of
Missouri, 960 F.2d 738, 740 (8th Cir. 1992). Haynes
presents no factual basis for his allegation of judicial bias
other than his disagreement with the magistrate judge’s
recommendations. ECF No. 260 at 16, 20, 26. To the contrary,
Magistrate Judge Bowbeer’s thorough and fair analysis
of Haynes’s claims evidences her unbiased and
unprejudiced review of the record. See generally ECF
based on the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
1. Plaintiff’s objection [ECF No. 260] to the
magistrate judge’s R&R is overruled;
2. The magistrate judge’s R&R [ECF No. 258] is
adopted in its entirety;
3. Defendants’ motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos.
160, 216] ...