United States District Court, D. Minnesota
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BOWBEER, United States Magistrate Judge
February 11, 2019, Petitioner Garang Hakim A. filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. [Doc No. 1.] Petitioner contends that he has
been subjected to prolonged detention and release is not
reasonably foreseeable. (Pet. at 7.) The Petition was
referred to this Court for a report and recommendation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and District of Minnesota
Local Rule 72.1. Since the Petition was filed, Petitioner has
been released from custody. As a result, the Court recommends
that his Petition be dismissed as moot.
is a citizen and national of South Sudan who entered the
United States as a refugee on approximately November 28,
1995. (Wright Decl. ¶ 4 [Doc. No. 5].) Petitioner's
immigration status was never adjusted to lawful permanent
19, 2018 Petitioner was convicted in state court of
possession of methamphetamine and received a jail sentence at
the Minnehaha County Jail in Sioux Falls, South Dakota.
(Id. ¶ 6-7.) Soon after, immigration officials
commenced removal proceedings against Petitioner.
(Id. ¶ 8.) On April 10, 2019 Petitioner was
ordered removed from the United States. (Resp. Ex. G at 1
[Doc. No. 9-1].) However, because ICE could not
“effect [Plaintiff's] deportation or removal
during the period prescribed by law, ” Petitioner was
released under supervision two weeks later. (Id.)
article III, section 2, of the United States Constitution,
federal court jurisdiction is limited “to actual,
ongoing cases and controversies.” Haden v.
Pelofsky, 212 F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 2000).
“When, during the course of litigation, the issues
presented in a case lose their life because of the passage of
time or a change in circumstances . . . and a federal court
can no longer grant effective relief, the case is considered
moot.” Id. (citation and quotation marks
omitted). Article III mootness divests the Court of subject
matter jurisdiction. See Id. If a court determines
that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction at any time during
a case, the court must dismiss the action. Fed.R.Civ.P.
filing his Petition, Petitioner has received the relief he
sought: “immediate release on appropriate
conditions.” This leaves nothing for the Court to grant
by way of habeas relief. Any such order would be ineffectual
and result in no change. “This is the very definition
of mootness.” Kargbo v. Brott, No. 15-CV-2713
(PJS/LIB), 2016 WL 3676162, at *2 (D. Minn. July 6, 2016).
recommending dismissal of the Petition for mootness, however,
the Court must determine whether any of the following
exceptions to mootness exist:
(1) secondary or “collateral” injuries survive
after resolution of the primary injury; (2) the issue is
deemed a wrong capable of repetition yet evading review; (3)
the defendant voluntarily ceases an allegedly illegal
practice but is free to resume it at any time; or (4) it is a
properly certified class action suit.
Ahmed v. Sessions, No. 16-CV-02124 (DSD/HB), 2017 WL
3267738, at *2 (D. Minn. July 11, 2017) (quoting Riley v.
I.N.S., 310 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir. 2002)), R.
& R. adopted, No. 16-CV-2124 (DSD/HB), 2017 WL
3268176 (D. Minn. July 31, 2017).
Court concludes that none of the exceptions apply in this
case. First, there are no surviving secondary or collateral
injuries. Although Petitioner remains subject to the
conditions of supervision, “those conditions would
remain in place even if habeas corpus relief were to be
granted.” Mohamed v. Sessions, No. 16-CV-3828
(SRN/BRT), 2017 WL 4417706, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 14, 2017),
R. & R. adopted, 2017 WL 4410765 (D. Minn. Oct.
3, 2017). Second, the grounds raised in the Petition are not
“capable of repetition but evading review, ”
because there is no reason to believe that Petitioner will
again be subject to a prolonged detention. See Spencer v.
Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998) (holding that the
“capable of repetition doctrine applies only in
exceptional situations” where “there is a
reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will
be subject to the same action again”). Of course, it is
possible-even likely-that Petitioner will again be detained
by ICE once his removal is finalized. But detention for a
period of 90 days in preparation for deportation is lawful. 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a). Third, there is no reason to believe
that Respondents voluntarily ceased an unlawful action
purposely to deprive this Court of jurisdiction. Finally, the
exception relating to class actions is inapplicable, because
Petitioner requested relief only on his own behalf, not on
behalf of a class of individuals. See Ahmed, 2017 WL
3267738, at *2.
based on all the files, records, and proceedings herein,
IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Garang Hakim
A.'s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28