United States District Court, D. Minnesota
S. Doty, Judge
matter is before the court upon petitioner Andrea Lee
Sanders's objection to the November 13, 2019, report and
recommendation (R&R) of Magistrate Judge Katherine
Menendez. In the R&R, the magistrate judge recommended
that Sanders's petition for writ of habeas corpus be
denied and the court not issue a certificate of
appealability. Sanders timely objected.
court reviews the R&R de novo. 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C); D. Minn. LR 72.2(b). After a careful review,
the court finds that the R&R is well reasoned and
2014, Sanders pleaded guilty in state court to one count of
third-degree assault. Pet. Ex. A, at 1. Sanders was sentenced
to 180 days in the Dakota County jail, followed by five
years' supervised probation. Id. Based on the
information presented by Sanders, it does not appear that he
is currently in state custody. See generally id.
Sanders's supervision is set to expire in February of
2020. Id. at 2. Sanders filed the instant petition
on October 21, 2019, arguing that his state conviction
violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments. See generally id. In alleging these
constitutional violations, Sanders contends that respondents
violated 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242. Id. at
Authority of the Magistrate Judge to Issue the
threshold issue, Sanders argues that it was improper under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73(b) for the magistrate
judge to issue an R&R because he did not consent to the
magistrate judge ruling on this matter. On the contrary, Rule
73(b), referring to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), requires consent
only where the magistrate judge enters final judgment.
Section 636(b)(1)(B) grants magistrate judges the power to
issue R&Rs on habeas petitions and § 636(b)(1)(C)
then directs the district court to review de novo any portion
of the R&R to which objections were properly made. As
such, the magistrate judge properly issued an R&R on
Sanders's petition, and the court will now review de novo
the portions of the R&R to which Sanders has specifically
first objects to the magistrate judge's determination
that dismissal is proper because he had not exhausted all
available state court remedies before filing his habeas
petition, as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c).
Sanders asserts that such exhaustion is not required when a
petitioner files suit under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. Although Sanders is correct that
exhaustion is not required for § 1983 claims, see
Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982), he
has not brought a § 1983 claim. As discussed above,
given that Sanders's petition largely challenges the
legality of his conviction, and his insistence that his
filing be construed as a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
the magistrate judge properly construed it as such.
Therefore, Sanders was required to exhaust available state
remedies before bringing his petition. 28 U.S.C. §
2254(b)-(c). His failure to do so warrants dismissal.
next objects to the magistrate judge's determination that
his petition is time barred under 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d)(1)(A). The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 imposes a one-year limitations period for
challenging a state court judgment in a federal habeas
petition, which typically begins to run on “the date on
which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct
review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Sanders argues
that this one-year limitations period violates the Suspension
Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
the limitation period violates the Suspension Clause depends
on whether the limitation period renders the habeas remedy
“inadequate or ineffective” to test the legality
of detention. See Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372,
381 (1977); United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205,
223 (1952). The burden is on the petitioner to demonstrate
inadequacy and ineffectiveness. Cf. Abdullah v.
Hedrick, 392 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 2004).
may exist where the limitation period in § 2244 raises
serious constitutional questions and possibly renders the
habeas remedy inadequate and ineffective. Cf. Triestman
v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 373-380 (2d Cir.1997)
(discussing inadequacy and ineffectiveness with regard to
§ 2255). After considering Sanders's claims,
however, the court is satisfied that such circumstances are
not implicated here. Sanders does not contend, for example,
that his conviction is unconstitutional because he is
actually innocent or incompetent. See Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 352-56 (1996); Schlup v.
Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-29 (1995). Moreover, §
2244(d) is not jurisdictional and as a limitation may be
subject to equitable tolling. See Calderon v. United
States District Court, 128 F.3d 1283, 1287-88 (9th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1099 (1998). The
one-year time period begins to run in accordance with
individual circumstances that could reasonably affect the
availability of the remedy, see §
2244(d)(1)(B), (D); see also Calderon, 128 F.3d at
1289 (tolling the limitation period for extraordinary
circumstances over which the inmate had no control), but
requires petitioners to diligently pursue claims.
pleaded guilty in late 2014 and was sentenced in early 2015.
He did not appeal his conviction or sentence, and he does not
allege in his petition that he was unable to do so due to
circumstances beyond his control. As such, the one-year
limitation does not violate the Suspension Clause and the
magistrate judge was correct in concluding that Sanders's
petition is time barred. Because he did not appeal,
Sanders's judgment became final on May 18, 2015 - 90 days
after the imposition of his sentence. See Minn. R.
Crim. P. 28.02, subdiv. 4(3)(a); Gonzalez v. Thaler,
565 U.S. 134, 150 (2012). Under § ...